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Man of noble character is keen on wealth and takes no money but in a moral way.
- Confucius (551-479 BCE)
Abstract: Through historical reviews and case studies, this research seeks to understand
why some initially successful entrepreneurs failed in the economic boom of past decades.
Among various factors contributed to their downfalls are a unique political and business
environment, fragile financial systems, traditional cultural influences and personal
characteristics. Notwithstanding that these factors should be further tested through
empirical studies, those high-profile entrepreneurs are oblivious but essential actors in the
grand theater of China’s economic transformation, and their failures have contributed to
the swift development of the Chinese entrepreneurship over the last thirty years.
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Introduction
In any competitive business environment, both success and failure are expected.

Of all new businesses launched, a great majority will fail sooner or later, as entrepreneurs
will need not only luck and timing but also vision and perseverance to succeed. So failure
is not something to be shamed, but a great motivation factor for some new innovations
and future undertakings.
China’s economic transformation over the last thirty years is filled with stories of
success and failures. Just as an old Chinese adage on human endeavors summarized while winners were hailed as king, losers generally ended up as criminals - many of the
failed entrepreneurs discussed in this paper have been allegedly involved in economic
crimes of some sort. Whether publicly acknowledged or not, capitalist crimes have been
growing as fast as the country’s economy. According to a survey by the Political &
Economic Risk Consultancy, China is considered to be among the three most corrupt
countries in Asia (Economist, 1995). Despite the continuing efforts by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to crack down, corruption in China has grown both in frequency
and scope. Corrupt acts that qualify as crimes include embezzlement, bribery,
misappropriation, illegal earnings and illegal profiteering, but not squandering, privilege
seeking, violation of accounting rules, and moral decadence (Shieh, 2005). In order to
have a better defined scope, however, this study will not cover the high-rank officials
involved in bribery and corruption scandals, such as Chen Liangyu of Shanghai, Liu
Zhihua of Beijing and Wang Xuebing of Bank of China, although their cases are closely
related to the Chinese economic reform of the last thirty years.
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This is China’s Gilded Age, a period of growing wealth and industrialization, and
a time of great ups and downs. Distinctive of capitalism in its early, exuberant stage of
development, as noted by Mihm (2007), this period is one in which technology has
improved dramatically, and markets have burst their older boundaries. Yet the country is
still relying on outdated regulations to control its booming commerce. Consequently
when the lines between legitimate and fraudulent means of making money become
blurring, laws will be broken and the downfall of many entrepreneurs will be inevitable,
and more will follow their paths, until China’s regulatory institutions catch up with its
economic ambitions.
Since there are so many failed entrepreneurs, this study will try to focus on
private or collective businesses, and those cases that have profound impacts on Chinese
economic development. Comparing with the state-owned companies, the private sector in
China is extremely dynamic, growing at around 20 percent a year, more than twice as fast
as the economy as a whole. It has grown to contribute about two-thirds of China’s gross
domestic product and fixed capital investment, 70 to 80 percent of tax revenue for local
government, and is responsible for most of the country’s job creation by employing more
than 75 percent of people in urban areas (James, 2005). Therefore focusing on private
entrepreneurs will likely present a more accurate and realistic picture of the Chinese
economic reform.
Listed below are ten cases of high-profile failures of Chinese entrepreneurs. They
ranged from elementary school dropout to post graduates of China’s elite colleges, from
village leader and street vendor to PLA officer and inventor. They were not only
dreamers and reformers, but also guanxi builders, risk takers and gamblers. All in all,

2

they are important actors on the grand stage of China’s dramatic economic transformation
over the past three decades, and through their ultimate downfall the glories and
misfortunes of Chinese economic reform have been vividly documented.

2

Ten Cases of High-profile Failures of Chinese Entrepreneurs
According to Forbes in 2001, Gu Chujun (1959-), a prominent Chinese

entrepreneur, was China’s 20th richest person with 236 million dollars of wealth. Born in
Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, Gu received his college education from Tianjin University.
After he patented the chlorofluorocarbon-free refrigerant technology in 1990, Gu formed
the Greencool Technologies, which served as the base for his corporate expansion
ambition. His crown jewel was Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings, then one of the
largest refrigerator companies in China. However in 2005, Gu was accused of overstating
revenue, falsifying registered capital and embezzling company money. Gu denied the
accusations, claiming that his alleged crimes were “common practices” in an “unfriendly
environment” where authorities only supported state-owned enterprises and foreign
investment.
Huang Guangyu (Wong Kwong Yu 1969-), known as “the Price Butcher” and one
of the country’s most dynamic young entrepreneurs, is a classic rags-to-riches story.
Huang is in many ways the physical embodiment of China’s economic miracle of the last
three decades. As a high school dropout he moved to Beijing at age 16 with his brother
and began selling radios and gadgets from a small shop. With $500 and a vision that an
increasing level of income would go along with an increasing demand for household
appliance, they eventually formed the nation’s largest electronics retailing chain Gome,
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or Best Buy of China. As of June 2008, the company had 12% share of China’s electrical
retail market, with 828 stores in 198 Chinese cities, selling everything from Dell
computers to Apple I-pods. Hurun Report in 2008 listed Huang as the richest person in
China, worth about $6.3 billion. In November 2008, Huang was detained by police for
alleged security fraud on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
A self-made businessman and China’s “most wanted” fugitive, Lai Changxing
(1958-) was the head of Yuanhua Group based in Xiamen, a coast city located in Fujian
Province. In the late 1990s Lai was indicted in the largest smuggling and corruption case
in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Begun trading imported goods in the
1980s, Lai later built a smuggling monopoly in Xiamen. In a four-year period from 1996
to 1999, Lai’s company smuggled in an estimated 53 billion yuan (US$6.38 billion)
worth of goods, resulting in the loss of an estimated 30 billion yuan (US$3.6 billion) in
taxes, which amounted to about a half of national revenues from tariffs in 1998. When
the dust finally settled, more than 600 people were involved in the smuggling operation,
of which more than half were put on trial by 2001. While Lai fled to Canada upon tipped
by corrupt officials, Yuanhua case have led to death sentences to 18 people, seven of
them have been executed; and at least 12 individuals are currently serving life sentences.
Mou Qizhong (1941-), one of China’s richest entrepreneurs in the 1990s, is the
former president of Nande Economic Group based in Tianjin. Once hailed as China’s
reform hero, Mou started out with only 500 yuan, but like an alchemist he transmitted
that into millions. His magic was to profit from an economy that in those days had huge
demand but little cash. Mou was known for swapping 500 railway cars full of surplus
Chinese goods for four Soviet-built aircrafts, which netted him tens of millions of dollars
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in 1992. A man of ambition and imagination, Mou was full of dreams. He intended to
purchase a Russian aircraft carrier for the Chinese navy, and considered to blow an
opening through the Himalayas so that moist air from the Indian Ocean could be diverted
to the dry regions of northern China. He also wanted to become China’s king of
privatization, setting up overseas holding companies to acquire state-owned assets, taking
advantage of tax concessions to foreigners (Economist, 2000). However in a few short
years, because of those multiple undertakings, his company accumulated major debts and
was unable to resume normal operations. In 1999 Mou was charged with defrauding
banks of $75 million by using fraudulent letters of credit and sentenced to 18 years
behind bars.
Once known as the “king of Chinese capital”, Tang Wanxin (1964-) was the
president of D’Long Strategic Investments. Founded in 1986, D’Long Group first
branched out into entertainment, computers, tourism and agricultures. In the early 1990s
Tang jumped into China’s burgeoning stock market and quickly made tens of millions.
Only a decade later D’Long grew to become the controlling partner of 200 firms worth
billions of yuan listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Tang had
aggressively sought to acquire companies both in China and abroad, leveraging his
buyouts with borrowed money that carried annual interest rates as high as 20 percent.
Although initially impressive, D’Long became an unsustainable stock market bubble. In
2004 when the central government ordered tightening of lending to stave off a looming
bad loan crisis in China’s banking system, the value of D’Long collapsed, resulted in the
loss of billions of yuan and an eight-year prison sentence for Tang.
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Yang Bin (1963-) was once listed by Forbes as the second richest man in China,
with an estimated $900 million in assets in 2001. Born in Nanjing, Yang was orphaned at
age five, but later attended the Chinese Naval Academy and served as a PLA officer.
With a scholarship he went to study in the Netherlands, where he made a fortune with a
Dutch company. Upon returning he launched horticulture and real estate business in
northeast China. His Euro-Asia Group was one of the first private Chinese enterprises to
list shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. During his brief business career Yang had
developed a reputation for his keen ability to generate large investment capitals from
various international banks. However his fortunes shifted after a corruption scandal in
Shenyang toppled the mayor, who had supported him. Under pressure, Yang traveled to
Pyongyang, donated millions of dollars and developed ties to North Korean leaders. Yet
just days after being appointed by North Korean leader Kim Jon II to be the head of a
new special economic zone near the border with China, Yang was arrested in China for
economic crimes and tax evasions. He was sentenced to 18 years for bribery, forgery,
contract fraud and illegal use of agricultural land.
Yang Rong (1956-) has contributed both fame and infamy to the Chinese
economic reform. From a humble background he achieved a milestone by leading a
Chinese company to the first global stock listing. His reputation and ability for wheeling
and dealing brought him both fortune and risks during his entrepreneurial career. Using
his connections at the highest levels of the central bank, he made the Brilliance China
Automotive to become the first Chinese company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange in 1992, and by 2001 he was ranked number three of the richest Chinese by
Forbes, with an estimated net worth of $840 million. However the fame also brought him
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unwanted attention to the supposedly state-owned company, and the provincial officials
were further irritated when he incorporated his holding company in Bermuda and
attempted to relocate its operations out of Shenyang. As the government began to
investigate the potentially illegal financial dealings he was alleged to have conducted
with Brilliance stock, Yang left China and sought refuge in the United States, where he
claimed he was wrongly prosecuted.
Famous peasant boss of Daqiu Village, Yu Zuomin (1930-1999) was one of the
pioneering entrepreneurs in the rural economic reform. Realized from early on that
agriculture could not serve as the source of wealth, he began to build factories in the late
1970s, one of first villages to do so in China. Within a year, his small steel mill earned
more money than the village profits combined over the past three decades. Thus more
factories were established, and Yu incorporated them into a village holding company in
which he served as the president of the new rural conglomerate. By 1992, Daqiu was
noted as the richest village in China, and its steel output constituted three percent of the
national production. However, Yu’s arrogance grew along with wealth and fame, as his
behaviors became increasingly dictatorial with little tolerance of different opinions or
criticisms. In 1993 Yu was arrested and found guilty of harboring criminals, obstructing
justice, bribery, unlawful detention and unlawful control of people. After being sentenced
to twenty years in prison, he died of heart attack while on parole a few years later.
A pharmacist and former PLA officer, Zhao Xinxian (1941-) was the chairman of
Sanjiu Enterprise Group, a large state-owned enterprise based in Guangdong. After
receiving his degree in pharmacology, Zhao went to work for a military hospital in
Guangzhou. In 1985 he founded the Nanfang Pharmaceutical with several colleagues,
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and two years later began to produce a traditional medicine for treating gastric disorders.
It became an instant hit and the firm quickly grew to be the best-known and most
profitable pharmaceutical company in Chinese medicine. Encouraged by the initial
success, Zhao undertook a massive expansion drive in the mid-1990s, diversifying into
eight lines of business including pharmaceutical, agricultural products, tourism and real
estate development. During its peak the group controlled over 100 companies with
combined assets of nearly 20 billion yuan. However due to unsustainable expansion
strategies, the group collapsed a few years later and Zhao was arrested for alleged
economic crimes.
Former head of Nongkai Development, Zhou Zhengyi (Chau Ching-ngai 1961-)
was the self-proclaimed richest man in Shanghai. Although he did not complete high
school, Zhou had a very quick mind and was a risk-taker. At age 17 he went to work by
cooking dumplings at a small restaurant and later sold clothes at a street stall. Taking
advantage of China’s shift to a market economy, he began trading in goods between
provinces, and later playing stock market by buying shares issued to employees of state
firms at low prices before they listed, allowing him to reap huge gains. Be capitalizing on
numerous ventures, he became a major investor of stock markets in both Hong Kong and
Shanghai. Considered an eccentric, Zhou symbolized the term Baofahu -“explosively
rich”, which refers to China’s unique breed of nouveau riche: uneducated but enormously
wealthy and not afraid to flaunt it. In 2003 Zhou was accused of illegally purchasing bank
loans and state land; and shortly after serving his three-year sentence, Zhou was again
accused of forgery of business documents that resulted in an illegal gain of millions of
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dollars. He was convicted of embezzlement, bribery and forgery in 2007, this time with a
16-year jail term.
It should be noted that not all failed Chinese entrepreneurs are involved with
economic crimes. Some of the misfortunes are more associated with the underdeveloped
systems instead of individual reasons, such as the cases with Li Jingwei of Jianlibao
Group and Pan Ning of Kelon Holdings. The underlying truth is that there is always a
human face behind every successful or devastating story of the Chinese economic reform,
such as Shi Yuzhu of Giant Group who experienced both triumph and collapse and then
came back reinventing himself, or Sun Hongbin who fell first at Lenovo and tried and
crashed again with his real estate firm Sunco. There are just too many tales to tell all
here. In any event, in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese
entrepreneurial development, the following sections of this study will attempt to address
various factors that might contribute to those high-profile failures mentioned above.

3

Unique Political and Business Environment
Most people agree that over the past thirty years China has been experiencing one

of the most turbulent transformation periods in its long economic history. Under the socalled socialist market economy, the country has had a unique business environment with
Chinese characteristics. After changing gear from planned to market economy, while the
rules and regulations being gradually established and continually improved, they
generally lag behind the reality of the business practices. Enterprises and entrepreneurs
have been facing enormous challenges both in and outside business environment. On
many occasions they have to go through gray areas, and break some legal boundaries in
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order to move forward. Notable among all risks faced by Chinese entrepreneurs are swift
changes of political policies, because of their substantial impacts on business operations.
As numerous examples illustrated, a simple miscalculation could spell doom for their
businesses that entrepreneurs have built up over years. When confronting with
government authorities, private entrepreneurs generally lose, as with Li Jingwei of
Jianlibao Group and Pan Ning of Kelon Holdings in their respective struggles over
company ownership reforms.
Unlike in the more developed Western economies, in the transition period of
China, the government still controls many scarce resources, such as access to capital, the
authority to examine and approve projects, government purchasing, the authority to
examine and to approve firm’s listing in the stock market, the authority to use the land,
etc. Private entrepreneurs must gain the government’s support in order to get those
resources. According to Tian (2007), there are around 2000 authorities to examine and
approve economic activities just at the central government level. As noted by Dalglish
(1993), China has a history of allowing officials to profit from their positions of
authority; the mandarins of the dynasties expected to be paid for services rendered. More
recently during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution when there were chronic shortages
of many goods, the Chinese became accustomed to using the so-called “back door” to get
things done. Clearly an inefficient bureaucracy is one of the key factors that support of
corruption, which was one of the main objections voiced by the student protests in
Tiananmen Square in 1989. It is precisely the difficulty of getting bank loans that fosters
a gambling instinct and creative approach to the law among ambitious Chinese
entrepreneurs.
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As Savadove pointed out (2007), the rise of the street-smart entrepreneurs like Lai
Changxing and Zhou Zhengyi in many ways embodies the growth of private companies
in China and illustrates how political connections can bring success in the country’s
freewheeling business environment. Politics, as well as crime, are the real story behind
virtually every high-profile case. Business people for their part, pay bribes to buy
political protection for misdeeds, such as tax evasion or misappropriation of public assets.
Bribes secure lucrative land deals, government contracts, and rights to buy state
enterprises at cut-rate prices. For businessmen, an official on the take is what Chinese call
“a mountain to lean against.” The overlap between business and party in an authoritarian
system makes a “red-collar crime” (Lague and Lawrence, 2002). Among all the highprofile entrepreneurs mentioned above, Yang Bin’s case stands out. Allegedly Yang was
close to Vice Premier Li Lanqing, as well as to Liaoning Governor Bo Xilai, one of the
stars of the so-called Fifth Generation of Chinese leaders. This would certainly explain
his initial phenomenal success. However Yang made one fatal mistake when he failed to
keep the Chinese government properly informed about his proposed plan of a special
economic zone with North Korea. Yang was seen as a victim of the complex relationship
between China and North Korea, of his own political naivety, and of a management style
that ran his company as family business.
Within the enterprises discussed above, the issue of corporate structure and
governance may be one important factor that contributed to their eventual downfall. As in
Chinese society, patriarchy prevails in business world, especially in private enterprises.
For example, Yu Zuomin ran his Daqiu conglomerate like a feudal dictatorship, and
Yuanhua’s board consisted of mainly Lai’s close family members, including his wife,
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three brothers and brother-in-law, with Lai served as chairman. The Tendency toward
having a “weak board and strong chairman” is common in China, and boards tend to be
tight-knit groups built on business or personal networks (PR Newswire, 2007).
Independent directors are mostly brought in to fulfill legal requirements and are limited
to advisory roles. Personal networks and connections are largely what bind those boards
together. Although this is very much in line with the Chinese cultural tradition of guanxi,
it also opens the door for cozy relationships that can breed corporate corruption. As noted
by Sun and Zhang (2006), so far the corporate governance restructuring of China’s
publicly listed companies has been opaque with one-sided outcomes in favor of mangers
and local officials. To be a full-fledged member and effectively compete in the global
business environment, this will be one of the major challenges for Chinese entrepreneurs,
companies and regulators in the near future. Looking forward, China will have to
improve its legal and social systems in order to reduce further turmoil and avoid any fatal
collapse of its remarkable economic transformation.

4

Fragile Financial System
Closely associated with the nation’s political environment, the financing system

that supports China’s economic growth is very fragile. The country may have one of the
fastest-growing economies in the world, but the financial infrastructures that support new
businesses are rudimentary at best. Since bank loans go overwhelmingly to state-owned
firms, private enterprises are at a particular disadvantage when it comes to financing
growth. They are also in weak position when competing with large international firms in
terms of finance and taxation. As one expert summarized, if the private sector is China’s
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brightest hope, the financial system is its weakest link (James, 2005). In recent years
David Barboza of New York Times has written several reports on business scandals and
corruptions in China. According to Barboza (2005), when the country awash in
speculative money intended to fuel its economic boom, many executives have turned
greedy, and even low-level employees are engaging in self-dealing transactions by
funneling millions of dollars into offshore accounts. Weak regulations and oversights,
deep-seated government corruptions and poor risk-management practices are to blame for
allowing fraud artists and looters to run off long before investigators discover that
anything is missing.
This view is generally shared by other observers. As Lague and Lawrence (2002)
pointed out, China’s economic boom created almost ideal conditions for an explosion of
financial crime, where loosely controlled privatizations, poorly regulated equity markets,
burgeoning foreign trade and huge flows of investment nourish rampant graft. In the
absence of independent courts, effective investigating authorities and a free media, it is
much easier to escape detection and punishment inside or outside the government and the
ruling party. Looking at the high-profile cases mentioned above, financial fraud and
embezzlement seem to be the main reasons for the downfall of the majority of those
entrepreneurs ranged from Tang Wanxin, Gu Chujun, Mou Qizhong to Yang Rong, Zhou
Zhengyi and Huang Guangyu. Although China only has a brief history in stock market
development, the recent rise of security fraud has been particularly alarming.
Without any surprise, China’s large state-owned banks have been plagued by
scandals over recent years. Consequently, thousands of people had been punished for
misappropriating money or making unauthorized loans, and billions of dollars of bad
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debts had to be erased from book by the government using its huge foreign currency
reserves. Although so far the corruption cases have yet to slow down China’s impressive
economic growth, the country’s banking and financial systems have to be modernized for
China to be a truly economic superpower in the twenty-first century.

5

Personal Characteristics
Over the course of Chinese business reform, more than 10 million enterprises

have been established; most of them are privately run. While a great majority of those
enterprises were developed legally, some became wealthy by taking advantage of corrupt
officials’ greed, while others got rich by grasping market opportunities. Luck often goes
with capability, as noted by Wang (2003), only those who are capable of grasping those
opportunities can assert they are lucky. While reviewing individual backgrounds of failed
entrepreneurs listed above, certain personal characteristics are observed. Many of them
had very humble beginnings, born in countryside and grown in dare poverty, which likely
motivated them to seek change in their fates and move ahead at all cost. Whilst some
graduated from elite universities in China, others did not even complete primary school.
Regardless their different educations, they all seemed to be strong-minded and hard
working individuals, who were street smart and willing to gamble and take risks, and
have demonstrated high levels of social intelligence with people around them.
However on many occasions it is this personal greed and gambling mentality that
led to their initial success and eventual downfall. As with Tang Wanxin, Sun Hongbin
and Zhao Xinxian, whose inflated egos prevented them to have a clear vision of the risks
and benefits associated with their aggressive business expansion strategies. A strong
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determination is certainly a virtue in a competitive business environment. Nevertheless
when a person cannot listen to different opinions or tolerate others’ criticisms, it becomes
pure madness. As the stories of Mou Qizhong, Yang Bin and Yu Zuomin confirmed, they
gambled and lost dreadfully, along with their multi-million dollar businesses as
sacrifices.
Perhaps the case of Lai Changxing is the best example to illustrate the impact of
personal characteristics on business operations. Born in 1958 into a peasant family of
eight in a village near the port city of Quanzhou, Lai was flamboyant and elusive, known
for his generosity and thoughtfulness. With a magic charisma, he was respectful and
gregarious. Lai was especially adept at identifying people’s weaknesses, whether they are
money, art or women, and exploiting them in a way that established a personal
connection. He was a natural at setting up businesses, at engaging people, drawing them
to his cause, charming and bribing them. Despite being an elementary school dropout, Lai
enjoyed a growing reputation and status as a successful businessman and community
leader. He was well known for his many charitable activities in the late 1990s. He was an
honorary citizen of Xiamen, a member of the Fujian Political Consultative Committee,
and received an award as a ‘Famous National Private Entrepreneur’ from the National
Industrial and Commercial Association for his flood relief efforts. The fact that he could
manage to achieve all those while still maintaining a near monopoly of smuggling
operation in Xiamen demonstrated his high social intelligence and criminal mastermind.

6

Influences of Chinese Culture
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Beneath the role of personal characteristics lies a cultural tradition of thousands of
years, which has a much deep impact on how Chinese entrepreneurs behave and function
in the business world. Despite its speed and volume of growth, the Chinese economy, and
behind it the Chinese culture, is still a fairly new player on the global stage, therefore its
significance may not be so obvious to some outside observers. In review of the legacy of
Chinese culture on its entrepreneurial development, it is clear that the concept of guanxi (
关系) has a very profound influence on the establishment of personal relationships and
business transactions. Guanxi has played a vital role in the evolution of Chinese society.
The cultural emphasis on personal relationships means that Chinese business connections
and deals are built on guanxi ties. Strongly influenced by Confucian teachings, Chinese
view other individuals in terms of particularistic relationships. Guanxi is “an informal,
unofficial relationship utilized to get things done, from simple tasks to major life choices”
(Ruan, 1993). Simply put, guanxi is an interpersonal network that Chinese use as a
crucial social resource to pursue their persona interests (Brown, 2002). Guanxi is not just
something mechanical, or simply a Western version of networking. It is about “affectual
relations” among people. Guanxi is an emotional bond, and requires cultivation over time
(Gold, 2001). In business world, guanxi practice has evolved into a powerful and flexible
tool that allows people to create trustworthy, expansive business networks in the absence
of adequate legal guarantees – a type of capitalism without contracts (Hsu, 2005).
However guanxi is also a double-edged sword. As the social relationship being developed
without any boundaries, it may eventually jeopardize businesses and doom entrepreneurs.
As the cases with Yang Bin and Lai Changxing cleared illustrated, when the bottom line
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was crossed and serious crime committed, even the so-called “mountain to lean on”
would not be able to protect them.
In Chinese traditional ethics, according to Lu (1997), the relationship between Yi (
义) and Li (利) has been a very old and recurrent topic. Li means benefits and Yi refers to
the principle of norms of obtaining and distributing benefits or profits. Yi as the core
notion in Chinese traditional ethics has an indissoluble bond to Li. The connection
between them is expressed by the deep-rooted Confucian view: “A person of noble
character can understand Yi, but a low person only knows Li” (Lu, 1997). An individual
who puts Li ahead of Yi (见利忘义) is not a true gentleman. As early as twenty-five
hundred years ago Confucius had stated his personal belief that there was a Tao or right
way of seeking wealth. According to him: man of noble character is keen on wealth and
takes no money but in a moral way (君子爱财, 取之有道). However throughout the brief
history of Chinese economic reform, there are numerous cases of personal greed and total
disregard of moral principles, as a number of entrepreneurs have demonstrated their lack
of basic respect to the notion of fair play and ethical bottom line. Focusing on a single
goal of relentless pursuit of personal wealth, to them there is no right or wrong in
business competition, only continual growth and eventual success. Although some of the
entrepreneurs were well educated, their ego, greed and gambling instinct made them
ignore the basic rules of business operation, thus leading their businesses on a dangerous
path of self-destruction.
Facing with mounting pressures from public to address the increasingly serious
issue, China’s ruling Communist Party has launched frequent crackdowns on government
corruption and business fraud during the past thirty years, hence resulting the exposure of
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numerous scandals involved with high-rank officials and the downfall of well-known
entrepreneurs. While some have argued (Shieh, 2005) that without addressing the root
causes of problem Chinese government’s approach was only a short-term solution, the
simple truth is that over a history of thousands of years, China’s legal culture has thrived
on the principle of “killing the chicken to scare the monkeys.” For many, the high-profile
businessmen like Zhou Zhengyi, Yang Bin and Yu Zuomin were conveniently those
conspicuous “chickens” during each show time.

7

Burden of “Original Sins”
At the onset of the economic reform, many of the first entrepreneurs in the early

1980s had low social status because they lived on the margins of society. They were often
ex-convicts who had no official connections and could not get respectable jobs in stateowned enterprise (Garnaut, 2008). After Deng Xiaoping made his audacious call for
people to get rich ahead of others, common views toward wealth and business began to
change. Entrepreneurs were hailed as reform heroes, who were brave enough to abandon
the old system and chart their own destinies, and would lead the society out of poverty.
However when the country is increasingly commercialized and income gaps
drastically widened, people begin to question the legitimacy of large amounts of wealth
cumulated by few individuals over such a short period of time. The public generally
believes that many of those private fortunes built through a process of primitive capital
accumulation during the 1980s and 1990s were based largely on illegal means. “Original
sin” refers to the way entrepreneurs fluted convention and laws to make the first “pot of
gold” to fund their start-ups (Cai, 2007). As noted before, the misconduct could range
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from smuggling, bribery, speculation, theft to tax evasion, loan fraud, organized crime
and subjecting workers to badly paid jobs in “sweat shops”. Reviewing the brief history
of the Chinese economic reform, one can observe at least three rounds of new wealth
generation or private redistribution where the “original sins” are committed. According to
Zang Xiaowei (2008), the first real wave of the well-connected new breed arrived with
the government’s dual-track pricing system in the mid-1980s. Referred as official
racketeering - the unscrupulous combination of speculation and political power managers of state-owned enterprises pocketed government subsidies and sold surplus
production on the private market at inflated prices. From the late 1980s, private real
estate became the next and much greater source of wealth, as developers only had two
main requirements: land and bank loans, both of which were allocated by officials. In
Shanghai, well connected “princelings” control nine of the top ten real-estate
development companies and 13 of the 15 largest building companies (Garnaut, 2008). A
third source of private wealth was management buy-outs of state-owned companies in the
late 1990s. Managers bought the companies at discount prices, fired excess workers and
quickly made huge profits. Two glitzy examples were Gu Chujun’s acquisition of
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings in 2001-02 and Yang Rong’s play with the
Brilliance China Auto.
Today wealthy Chinese are reviled as much as they are envied. Many Chinese see
wealth as simply the newest manifestation of political power: a currency that is bought,
stolen or inherited through guanxi connections with the government elite (Garnaut,
2008). As the widening income gap has sparked increased resentment toward rich people
in China, even the government’s official English paper China Daily (2007) has publicly
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acknowledged that it has been an open secret that many of today’s successful
entrepreneurs accumulated their wealth by smuggling, evading taxes, polluting the
environment and bribing officials to land lucrative business deals. The issue of “original
sins” has been hotly debated by not only ordinary citizens but also among Chinese
economists. A number of them consider given that many entrepreneurs built their wealth
initially through illegal means, their honesty and credibility would always be in question;
while others believe that society should not place the full blame on those millionaires.
Since China’s current regulations have problems of their own, tightening supervision and
changing regulations are the only solutions (Zou, 2003). If some “sins” were committed,
they probably would be more appropriately categorized as misdeed of the era or a broken
system instead of fault of certain individuals.
Notwithstanding the debate on the burden of “original sins”, the fact of the matter
is that successful entrepreneurs often come under much closer public and government
scrutiny after they reach the pinnacle of wealth. This may be an important contributing
factor in explaining the eventual downfall of those well-known entrepreneurs mentioned
above. Some of the billionaires and millionaires got into trouble because of problems in
capital flow caused by unlimited financial expansion and abuse. They bribed bank
officials and conducted financial fraud when they could not get loans through normal
procedures. While the government and the public usually pay scant attention to the tricks
of small enterprises, but as those enterprises develop, more and more people will examine
and scrutinize their operations, and any major mistake would be caught. In an efficient
economy, an enterprise can never be successfully developed through crooked means over
an extended period of time (Zou, 2003). Therefore under the increasingly developed
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market-oriented economy, it is not only possible and but necessary to run an enterprise
through normal and standardized ways; and it is the moral responsibility for today’s
entrepreneurs to operate their businesses in a socially accepted manner. The upcoming
challenge for China is to ensure that various measures are taken to rectify market order
and strengthen laws and regulations so that a sound and efficient market economy can be
established in the near future.

8

Conclusion
This is China’s Gilded Age, a period of rising wealth and industrialization, and a

time of great ups and downs. As Brown (2002) rightly pointed out, China is an extremely
complex society due to its deep cultural heritage and its rapid transformation from an
agrarian, plan-based economy to what the political leadership has called a “socialist
market economy with Chinese characteristics.” Along the turbulent course of economic
reform since 1978, some brave entrepreneurs seized the opportunities and succeeded,
while many others tried and failed miserably. Regardless their amazing triumphs or
heartbreaking failures, their stories already touched the lives of hundreds of millions, and
they have inadvertently contributed to the swift development of Chinese entrepreneurship
during the last three decades.
Many factors could contribute to the downfall of Chinese entrepreneurs. During
the chaotic process of economic transformation, entrepreneurs have to face various
challenges both in and outside business environment. Notable among all risks are the
abrupt changes of political policies, owing to their significant impacts on business
operations. In the area of financing, private entrepreneurs are at particular disadvantage.
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As Economist (2003) pointed out, it is precisely the difficulty of getting bank loans and
listings that fosters a creative approach to the law among ambitious Chinese
entrepreneurs. In terms of corporate structure and governance, patriarchy still prevailed in
business world especially in private enterprises, which may be another important factor
that contributed to their ultimate demise. With a history of thousands of years, the
behaviors of entrepreneurs have been deeply influenced by the Chinese cultural tradition.
In addition, under the burden of “original sins” and with a changing attitude toward
private wealth, Chinese entrepreneurs have been facing mounting scrutiny from public
and government. Entrepreneurs themselves will certainly have to bear some personal
responsibilities. The strong individual determination, sheer greed and gambling mentality
that contributed to the initial success could also lead to their eventual downfall. Due to all
those compelling reasons, their corporate failures seem to be inevitable. If were not them,
somebody else would very likely play exactly same or very similar roles. In a nutshell,
those high-profile entrepreneurs like Huang, Lai and Yang are oblivious but essential
actors on the grand stage of China’s economic transformation of last thirty years.
From a historical standpoint, it is necessary to reflect China’s entrepreneurial
growth on the global economic perspective. Over recent years it seems that public media
have been filled with all kinds of negative news about Chinese business operations from
loan fraud, bribery, speculation, theft, tax evasion, smuggling to sweat shops and
sacrificing safety in pursuit of profit. However, according to Mihm (2007), to see China
today is to glimpse, in a distant mirror, the 19th-century American economy in all its
corner-cutting, fraudulent glory. In many ways China is a younger version of the United
States or early industrial Britain; and its fast and loose brand of commerce is not an
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expression of national character, but a phase in the country’s development. As Mihm
suitably labeled, China’s “adolescent capitalism” is just like a typical teenager, bursting
with energy, exuberant, dynamic while reckless, irresponsible, and dangerous. Only with
this understanding, the rest of world can then begin to effectively work with China on the
best ways to deal with its growing pains.
Out of the chaos and failures, a new Chinese entrepreneurship is currently being
developed. Among the lessons learned from those high-profile downfalls, aspiring
Chinese entrepreneurs should always remember there is a Tao or right approach to seek
personal wealth. As Confucius noted over twenty-five hundred years ago, man of noble
character is keen on wealth and takes no money but in a moral way. To succeed in the
twenty-first century, entrepreneurs will have to work hard to gain the trust of both
Chinese and international communities; and on a broad scope, China in the coming years
will have to improve its legal, financial and social systems to establish the institutions
that will both support business development and clearly define corporate and personal
ethics.
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